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Appetites and Actions in Aristotle’s Moral Psychology
Tom Olshewsky, University o f Kentucky and Drexel University
The recognition in recent decades of Aristotle’s phenomenological modes of
inquiry has challenged long-standing interpretations of “Aristotelian doctrine”. One such
case is the so-called practical syllogism12, for which the conclusion is not a proposition,
but an action. This has been a stumbling block to our treatment of the reason/appetite
paradigm as the apparent source of human movement. What I hope to show here is that
the paradigm is a false start for attempts to understand the psychology of animate motion
in On the Soul III 9-11, at least as this has usually been understood. There, it serves
Aristotle only as an appearance for the beginning of an inquiry into the origins of animate
movement. Once properly understood, this account will lead us in turn to new
understandings of the practical syllogism.
The beginning for our current inquiry must lie not in explorations about
inferences from propositions, but rather in distinctions of dispositionalities. This is well
articulated in Aristotle’s own discriminations of rational from non-rational potentialities
in Metaphysics IX-5 :
Regarding potentialities o f the latter [non-rational potentialities], when the agent and
the patient meet in the way appropriate to the potentiality in question, the one must act
and the other be acted upon, but with the former [animate and rational], this is not
necessary. For the latter are productive o f one effect each, but the former are productive
o f opposing ones, so that they would produce contraiy effects at the same time; but this
is impossible. It is necessary, therefore, that the determination for this must be
something else; I call this appetite (όρεξ i v) or choice (προα ίρεσ iv). Which of the
two [effects] it yearns for ( όρέγηθαι ) decisively, that it will do, whenever it is
capable [of doing it] under the circumstances and it comes near to that which is capable
of undergoing it. (1048a6-12)

Two striking features of this account of rational action are that the determinate authority
for the action lies with ό ρ εξ ι ς rather than νους, and that ό ρ εξ ι g is here equated with
π ρ ο α ίρ ε σ ις . I take the accounts of motives to action in On the Soul III: 10, 11, to be an
exposition of the psychological conditions for just such a determination.
A third feature gives a base for my translation of ‘ό ρ ε ξ ις ' as ‘appetite’. As
Abraham Adel once noted, the etymology of the two terms is the virtually the same.
From the Latin, ap-petitio is to strive toward. The verb ‘ό ρ έγω ' basically meant to

11 say “so-called” here as a cautionary for our interpretation. Aristotle does not himself so call. But as Stan
Smith pointed out to me in another discussion, Aristotle uses the term ‘σΟΛογισμός' much more widely
and variably than, our standard notions of a three-term categorical syllogism, more in its traditional idiom of
collecting before the mind. It is important that we not begin at the outset with the presumption of an A-I-I
form into which we attempt to fit what Aristotle has to say about the practical syllogism. This has been a
flaw, I think, in much of the recent literature. In the time allotted, I cannot here engage critically with other
worthy efforts to parse the significance by Martha Nussbaum, J.B. Skemp, Henry Richardson, David
Charles, Steven Hudson, etc., but I remain critically conscious of their efforts.
2 Abraham Edel, Aristotle and His Philosophy, Chapel Hill, 1982, p. 430, n. 14. He argues briefly and
elegantly against current tendencies to translate ‘ο ρ ε ξ ι ς ’ as ‘desire’ with interesting allusions to
Eighteenth Century moral psychology.
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stretch out or to stretch toward. It was used already in Aristotle’s time by metaphoric
extension to mean to yearn for. In Aristotle’s hands, it receives further extension in his
account of matter as by its very nature yearning for its form {Physics I, 192al8). Thus,
his choice of 4ο ρ ε ξ ι ς ’ as his generic term for the appetitive links it to the
dispositionality of the unfulfilled seeking its fulfillment, of a lack seeking an object. He
can then in On the Soul III-9 classify βουλησις as a calculative appetite, έπ ι θυμ ία as a
desiderative appetite, and θ υμ ός as a passionate appetite, not according to their place in
the soul, but according to their function in their stretching out toward fulfillment.
Aristotle lays out this classification as a base for answering his initial question in
III-9 about what in the soul originates movement: Is it a single part of the soul? To this he
can answer that he has elaborated faculties that are far more distinct than the traditional
[platonic] parts, and that, if there were such parts, appetite would be in each, and it would
be absurd to break this faculty into parts. Having thus dispatched the platonic model, and
concluded that appetite cannot be analyzed in terms of parts or of other faculties, he
returns to his original question: What does originate movement in the soul? While noetic
functions (here including imagination) are inadequate to the role, since knowledge does
not necessarily produce action, appetite also evidently falls short, since the self-controlled
{¿γκρατής) follow their νους (sensibleness, puipose, apprehension) instead of their
yearnings and desires. Thus, there appear to be two principles of motion for animate
beings: δ ρ εξ t^and νους.
Were we to take this as the conclusion of the question of origins, it would be a
misstep. As so often happens with such preliminary explorations, what we have been
given are not conclusions, but άπορ ία of appearances, to be further explored. In III-10,
reasons are given for why the two appear to be the origins of motion (433al0-30), but
this exposes calculation and imagination in subsidiary roles relative to appetite. It is the
character of appetite to take an object - a yearning is a yearning for something. The
relevant calculative role is the practical one whose end-in-view is the object of appetite.
Key is the recognition that βουλησις is a form of ό ρ εξ ις (433a25), thus subsuming
practical reason as a function of appetite rather than as distinct from it. Νους is always
right (433a26), but π ρ α κ τό ν can be otherwise (433a31). This leads us on to the
appearance that the capacity in the soul that produces movement must be ο ρ ε ξ ις
(433a32).
Aristotle now seems to have resolved the issue, explaining opposing ό ρ ε ξ ε ι ς as
arising between βουλησις and ε π ιθ υ μ ία ,, both being appetite, when the former resists
with a view to the future, while the latter only considers appetite in the present (433b510). But, just when he can conclude that it is the ό ρ εκ τ ι κόν that originates motion in
the soul, he must acknowledge that the ό ρ ε κ τ ό ν , which is the object of the yearning,
must be first in originating movement. It moves the animal to yearning by being the
object of thought or imagination, thus contributing to the origin of motion without itself
being moved. The originators of motion prove to be plural after all. (433M0-12). Here
Aristotle exposes a kind of dual dispositionality that he has already developed in his
treatment of α ίσ θ η σ ις. Both perception and appetite take an object. Just as the object of3
3 Compare, for instance, the beginnings of Metaphysics VII-3, where form, matter and the composite are
preliminary candidates for substance, and by the end of the chapter, matter has been explicitly eliminated
from the list (1029a28)
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perception is the αίσθη τό ν that activates the αίσθη τ ι κόν, so the object of yearning is
the ό ρ ε κ τό ν that activates the ό ρ εκ τ ι κόν. Because it is the nature of both faculties of
the soul to require an object, they each also require a dual dispositionality, that within the
soul to become the activity and that without to undergo the activity. In both cases the
disposition of the umnoved object to be acted up is a precondition of the activity.4
In perception, the αίσθη τ ικ ό ν and the α ισ θ η τό ν become one in the
α ϊσ θ η σ ις . Where the dispositionalities of appetite differ from those of perception is in
the two-stage character of their fulfillment. In the first stage, the actualization of the
δ ρ εξ Lç itself arises from the linking of the two dispositions through the intermediaries
of perception, imagination and thought. This is what makes νοϋς (now in the broadened
sense to include imagination) a necessary component of the actualization of όρέξις. But
this is still only the first stage of the moves to movement: It is the coming-to-be of the
specific purpose-focused yearning. In an actualization that results in a βούλησις,
deliberation produces a choice, which is a grasping for a particular όρεκτόν before
another, thus specifying the specific ορεκτικόν that becomes activated. What makes for
the possible adversity among ορεκτικό, is the presence of multiple όρεκτά on any given
occasion. Determination of which objective to act upon is a determination of which
potential yearning is to become actual as the determinate yearning to be acted upon. Once
that is determined, the actualized δ ρ εξ ¿£ produces the movement to its fulfillment, the
second stage. It may be that deliberation takes place calculating the means to that
fulfillment and even which objective is best under the circumstances, but this too is a part
of the coming-to-be of the δ ρ εξ ις for this movement. The actual appetite, the δ ρ εξ ις is
the result of the deliberative process, not its antecedent. The β ο ύ λ ε υ σ ις of deliberation
produces the β ο ύ λ η σ ις of choice, and this π ρ ο α ί ρ ε σ ι ς is the δ ρ ε ξ ι ς . Once
formulated, the δ ρ εξ ις leads immediately to action. That which is moved moves in so
far as it reaches after something, and the κ t ν ε σ ι ς is the δ ρ εξ ις in so far as it is the
one that is έ ν έ ρ γ ε ia { 433b 18).
Where Aristotle began in III-10 with expanding the notion of νους to include
imagination, he now in III-l 1 projects imagination across other faculties of sensation and
calculation. 5 δ ρ εξ ις, as actualization of the ό ρ εκ τ ι κόν relative to ό ρ εκτό ν, is the
source of motion, but it cannot become so without imagination to put the two dispositions
into relation. For all animals that initiate movement, there must be at least some sort of
sensory imagination, but only those with reasoning capacity have calculative imagination.
It is this ability to trace implications for the future that enables the calculative to imagine
alternative objectives of appetition. Because calculative imagination can consider
multiple imagined objectives at the same time, it indeed has the potential for contrary
effects, as noted in Metaphysics IX-5, which is why choice is necessary to determine the
proper δ ρ ε ξ ι ς for this place and time and circumstance.
While.the calculative appetite may always pursue the apparently greater practical
good, the disposition to the calculative appetite does not always give cause for the actual
appetite. “Sometimes in the conflict among the imagined possible δ ρ εξ β ις, that
4 Here, I follow as a model Aiyeh Kosman’s treatment of perception in “Perceiving That We Perceive,”
Philosophical Review 84 (1975): 499-519.
5 Hendrick Lorenz, The Brute Within (O x f o r d , 2006) , o f f e r s a d e t a i l e d a c c o u n t o f
t h i s e x p a n d i n g r o l e o f φ α ν τ α σ ί α in the determination of appetite.

SAGP Newsletter 2007/8.1, p. 51

imagined appetite moves this one, as one celestial sphere moves another, appetite moving
appetite, so that ά κ ρ α σ ία comes into being.” (434al3) Here Aristotle seeks in an
analogy to the movement of the celestial spheres an account of how one envisioned
objective, moving another, by virtue of that movement, may have its own course. This
returns us to the problem of ά κ ρ α σ ία , but it also leads us on to reflections about
differences between the movements of the spheres and the coming to be of an όρεξ ις.
“Always in nature, the more dominant also moves, in as much as already three motions
are being moved. The capacity for knowing is not moved, but stands still.” (434al5)
What moves in the determination of an όρεξ ις are beliefs about such general knowledge
as applied to that determination. “Since on the one hand, there is the assumption and
account according to the whole, but on the other, that according to each situation (for one
assumption tells that there is need in such a situation to achieve such as this, and another
tells that such a situation is now, and that I am the one to achieve it), it appears that it is
this opinion that moves, not that according to the whole.” (434a20) The point here is that
our knowledge of the general does not change, only our application to a particular
situation in which a particular need is discerned.
This is not a prototype for a practical syllogism, with the first premise stating a
general truth and a second an application of that truth. For such an analysis to work, one
would need to build into the first premise some presumptions about a generalization
placing some value on a need fulfillment, with the second asserting that this situation is a
circumstance under which such fulfillment can be enacted. A more accurate reading, I
think, is that Aristotle is here still sorting out the roles of νους and ό ρ εξ ις in the origins
of movement. The role of knowledge is to stand still, and the dual applications of
knowledge as beliefs relevant to each situation, both that there is a need in this situation
to pursue some longing and that I am in a circumstance for pursuing such an objective
successfully. Both the appraisal of the appetitive disposition (the ό ρ ε κ τ lkóv) and the
appraisal of its objective in this situation (the όρεκτόν) are conditions on coming to the
determination of what I actually want here and now (the ό ρεξ ι g), but in deliberation for
action, those dispositions to appetite must be informed by knowledge. What is variable
and subject to change is not the knowledge itself, but the ways in which one applies it in
an individual situation.
At least two points in our analysis here tell against traditional inteipretations. First
is recognition that the determination of the relevant όρεξ ις as a product of deliberation,
not its antecedent. It is the activation of the ό ρ εκ τ ι κόν relative to the ό ρ ε κ τό ν that
produces the ό ρ ε ξ ις . For an έ π ιθ υ μ ία , all that is needed is for the perceptual
imagination to present the organism with an object that correlates to its need. For a
β ο ύ λ η σ ις , a calculation is required that determines which imagined objective best
fulfills the needs of the organism. This calculation opens the way for one need to move
another, so the β ο ύ λ η σ ις as determined often will be a product of one potential όρεξ t ς
competing with another. It may itself be swayed by the very competing forces it attempts
to resolve. How this comes about Aristotle does not spell out here, He only notes that
such deliberation does not alter our knowledge; only the beliefs regarding this situation
are altered. Second, it is the potential reaching out toward its potential objective that
produces the ό ρεξ ις. Deliberation aids in determining the right appetitive disposition
relative to the right dispositional objective in this situation.
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Some have sought an account of that deliberative process on the model of the socalled practical syllogism that has suggested itself in On the Motion o f Animals 7. Here,
Aristotle but draws an analogy between arriving at a conclusion in scientific inquiry and
coming to a motion. His aim here is to show why noetic activity (imagination or thought)
sometimes results in motion, sometimes not. For scientific inferencing, the reckoning up
(σ υ λ λ ο γ ι ζομ ένος) from the two propositions put forward (εκ των δυο
προ τά σ εω ν) yields a truth, but in matters of motion, the antecedents stretch forward to
an action. What determines the results are not the verities of nature, but the bringing
together the good and the possible. He accents that the good in question is not some soil
of ultimate good, but a good in view, an object of appetite (ό ρ ε κ τ ό ν ) and an object of
intention ( δ ι ανοη τό ν ) having to do with the aim of action (700b23-25).
Here we have very much a recapitulation of the account we already found in On
the Soul III-ll. If one were to conceive that all men must walk [under such and such
circumstances] and that he is a man, then he must walk. If one were to conceive the
opposite, then he must remain at rest. The must (the subjunctive -τε ό ν ) here has the
force not of moral obligation, but of a practical necessity, based on the already
determined end in view relevant to a need at hand that brings together the good and the
possible. In the case considered, the must is generated by an already actualized appetite.
The minor premise falls out enthymematically, Once it has been determined what is good
for man in general, one need not reflect about his own humanity (701a25-29). The result
is a direct move from a single protasis to an action6. “Face to face with the inquiring
noetics [perception, imagination, thought], the actuality of the appetite comes to be. I
want to drink, says ε π ιθ υ μ ί α ; this is drink, says perception, imagination or thought.
Immediately, I drink. In this way, animals start to move and act. The uttermost cause of
motion is appetite, arising after perception, or after imagination or thought.” (701a30-37)
Because appetite is the bridge from circumstantial observations to action by putting
together the want (ο ρ ε κ τ ικ ό ν ) with its object ( ό ρ ε κ τ ό ν ) , Aristotle castes it as a
cause and middle term in the definition of movement because it makes this bridge
(703a5). The explorations in analogy to syllogistic here have not to do, however, with the
arrival at decision to act through the course of deliberation since they clearly concern the
direct move from the already actualized appetite to action.
Aristotle’s account of deliberation and choice in Ethica Nicomachea also follows
on the dispositional account of coming to be of an op ε ξ ι ς in On the Soul. “When the
deliberative choice is the objective of appetite for us, the choice of this would also be the
devisable appetite for us, for from that which was deliberated, that is stretched toward the
object according to the deliberation.” (1113al0) The coming to be of the β ο ύ λ η σ ις is
the product of the β ο ύ λ ε υ σ ις , and as an actualized ο ρ εξ ις it already stretches out
toward its determined object to be achieved. “We might say, on the one hand, that the
objective according to true judgment is good in an unqualified sense, but, on the other, in
a particular circumstance the objective will be whatever appears to be good; that which is
true judgment for the diligent, chance for the frivolous.” (1143a23-26). So just because
6 The instance considered with multiple conditions (701al8-24) may well be treated on analogy to a sorites.
The need is for warmth; the covering is the object to satisfy that need, which leads to the coat as the object
to satisfy that need. The need for a coat leads then to the objective of making that coat. So the action
immediately undertaken is for the objective of bring into being the objective to satisfy the immediate need.
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the aim is for achieving what is best, one can make bad judgments about what is best in
this place and time. No one seeks only the apparent good, but whatever appears to be
good to the person will often appear to be good without qualification in this
circumstance. The one who deliberates with diligence will seek true judgment, but the
frivolous will take whatever chances to be his resolve. The judgment is not about what is
unqualifiedly good, but about what under the circumstances is most needed, and thus
what will be the best appetite to initiate what action to what goal.
The one place in the entire extant Aristotelian corpus that comes close to speaking
directly of a practical syllogism is in the context of fathoming practical wisdom in EN
VI-12: “For the conclusions drawn about practical things are those having a beginning,
since the end and the best is such, whatever it may be (for the sake of discussion, let it be
whatever it happens to be).” oí γάρ συλλογισμοί των πρακτών αρχήν εχοντές είσιν,
επειδή τοιόνδε τό τέλος καί τό άριστον, οτιδήποτε ον (έστω γάρ λόγου χάριν τό
τυχόν) (1144a31-34). The point being made is that this starting point will be evident to
the good man, but wickedness may pervert us into being deceived about the starting
point. The reference is not to a “practical syllogism”, per se, but to conclusions drawn
about practical things. The focus is on the end in view, discerned correctly as the best by
the good man, but distorted by those wanting in goodness. This discernment of the best
end in view is a matter of practical experience, not of deductive inference, and
experienced people have an eye for it. This again is the starting point for motion, the
όρ εκ τό ν that answers to the needs of the όρεκ τ ι κ ό ν .
The point that Aristotle repeatedly emphasizes in his accounts of deliberation is
that the relevant general is derivative from the individual circumstances relative to felt
needs. This is not a deductively reasoned starting point for determining action. Nor is it
some induction from an instance to a universal generalization, but rather a linking of a
specific appetitive disposition to a general objective that warrants the actualized όρεξ ι g.
If, to use his example (1147a25-b5), you observe in a situation a sweet, and you have the
general belief that all sweets are desirable to eat, considered without any qualification by
other considerations, you will, if able and not restrained, eat the sweet. But if, in the same
situation, you also have, for whatever circumstantial reasons (it will spoil your supper,
ruin your diet, rot your teeth, etc.), the conviction that sweets under these circumstances
are to be avoided, you may then have those contrary appetitive dispositions about which
Aristotle spoke in the Metaphysics and in the Psychology. Both computations are correct,
and each by itself would lead to action relative to the situation (one to eating, the other to
refraining), but they cannot both be enacted, so it cannot be that both appetitive
dispositions will become actual appetites for this person in this place and time. The
diligent and disciplined deliberator will on this occasion avoid the sweet (on some other
occasion, she might happily indulge that appetite). The frivolous will ignore or rationalize
the constraining considerations in order to pursue the desiderative appetite here and now.
The logic of the matter is not failure of knowing what is right, α πλός, since each general
is correct in abstraction, but, as a calculation to choice, under these circumstances, it is
the one that serves the well-being of the actor in the long run, not just the desire in the
immediate, and that produces the appropriate appetite to act upon.
So the deliberative process is not so much a proper inference from principle and
circumstance to a proposed action (which still leaves puzzling how the conclusion itself
is an action) as it is picking the right objective to enact on this occasion. That enacting is
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the actualization of an op ε ξ t ς in a choice that directly leads to the movement necessary
to achieve its objective. The role of νοϋς in grasping the right ό ρ ε κ τό ν is the
determination of which of the competing ό ρ εκ τ ι κόν is best fulfilled in this situation for
the well-being of the organism; but this, as Aristotle notes, is not a theoretical enterprise,
but one that depends upon disciplined habituation of dispositions. For the άκρα τής, the
problem is not so much a lack of knowledge, but a lack of discipline in applying what she
knows. This is a matter of dispositionalities, not of rational inferences.
We can imagine competing spheres of appetite for the akrasic. Perceptive
imagination says “There’s a sweet.” Epithumia\ (desiderative appetite) would say
“Sweets are pleasant,” and she would straight away eat it. But bouleusis\ (toward a
calculative appetite) would say, “Sweets will spoil your diet, and you will gain more
weight. What you really need now is exercise, which will blunt your desire for the sweet
and contribute to reducing weight.” But, bouleusis2 (toward boulesis2) would say, “A cup
of coffee is also pleasant, will slake my desire for the sweet, and drinking it will be a lot
easier than doing exercises right now.” Then perceptive phantasia (leading to epithumiai)
would say, “I used to enjoy a smoke with a cup of coffee - before I quit - and they really
are pleasant together (and bouleusis3 would add that a smoke would also help slake my
desire for the sweet).” So, whaf s an akrasic to do here and now, but light up! It’s not that
she doesn’t know the implications of her action. In all of this whirl of orectic spheres,
what nous knows remains unmoved. There is nothing defective in the logic of the
reflections, but even the deliberations that would lead to boulesis2 (which the person of
practical wisdom might well observe is only a second best) open the way for a new
sphere of desiderative appetite that leads to breaking a good habit in an effort to avoid an
immediate urge. The conflicting dispositions are deliberatively resolved into an appetite
that once chosen leads directly to action, but only an apparent good, not the best for her
well being. Clearly she knows all of the knowledge involved in these deliberations, but
does not apply it in a practical way that will foster her best interests in the long run. In the
whirl of the spheres of orexis, she has lost sight of that good, like a person drunk or
asleep7.
This account of ά κρα σ i a not only shows how one can know the good and not do
the good. It exemplifies how deliberation is a matter of matching up an objective for
action with the current needs of the organism. This is not a process of deductive inference
from a general moral truth applied to a particular circumstance, but a matter of joining
dual dispositions in the actualized appetite that then leads directly to action.

7 One might find a similar example in Oklahoma’s Ado Annie: “I’m just a girl who can’t say no,” [even
though] “I’ve known what’s right from wrong since I was ten,” [but]“when I’m with a feller, I forget.” She
even cites the Golden Rule as a rationale for obligation to kiss him back.

